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ESSAY
A SHORT PRIMER ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF FORENSIC




"[J]urors are quite capable of seeing through flaky
testimony and pseudoscientific claptrap. . . .we
should not waste our valuable time watching witch
doctors, voodoo practitioners or brujas go through
the entrails of dead chickens in a fruitless search
for the truth.",
2
For decades, aircraft pilots have been using pre-
flight and approach-to-landing checklists rather than
relying on their memory to ensure that everything has been
done in its proper sequence. The use of this tool gives
pilots the ability to fly their aircrafts safely and according
to an established procedure. Similarly, most trial attorneys
employ witness checklists during the in-court examination
of their witnesses to ensure that all of the witnesses'
evidence has been fully presented and their exhibits have
been properly marked and received in evidence. It is the
intent of this presentation to suggest the use of another
evidentiary checklist for attorneys: a forensic evidence
admissibility checklist.
When confronted with proving or disproving facts
at trial, many attorneys preliminarily conduct a mental
checklist to determine whether each individual piece of
1 Adjunct Professor of Forensic Evidence, Levin College of Law,
University of Florida
2 People v. Williams, 183 Cal. Rptr. 498, 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)
(Gardner, J. Concurring).
1
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evidence, either physical or testimonial, is admissible.
Often the answer is relatively simple, but finding that
answer may be rather complicated with forensic science
evidence; thus, the suggestion of a written checklist. If
annotated at each stage, checklists such as this may also
serve as the foundation for a memorandum to the court in
support of either inclusion or exclusion of the particular
evidence in question. An evidentiary checklist can be in
any form that the attorney might prefer, but it should be
short, using popular devices like talking point bullets. Each
bullet then represents an admissibility hurdle that must be
considered. The suggested bullets in this presentation are
simply the rules of evidence themselves, listed in the
logical order that the court will use to determine
admissibility. At each point in the checklist where an
admissibility issue arises, it is important to consider the
relevant case law for meeting that rule's requirements.
THE CHECKLIST
I. The Discretion of the Court
The first consideration of admissibility for scientific
evidence is the general proposition that it is the trial court
that is vested with not only the authority but also the
discretion to admit or exclude such evidence. 3 Typically,
the discussion regarding admissibility is not conducted
within the hearing of the jury. Additionally, because of the
3 TENN. R. EvID. 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject
to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination the
court is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to
privileges."). See, e.g., State v. Ellwood, 783 So. 2d 423, 427-430 (La.
Ct. App. 2001) (where Dr. William Bass was qualified as an expert
witness in the field of forensic anthropology).
2
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potential for lengthy testimony and exhibits in the case of
scientific evidence, the court's evidentiary hearing is often
completed in advance of trial by way of a motion in
limine.4 At any hearing concerning the admissibility of
evidence, including scientific evidence, the proponent of
that evidence bears the burden of proof by a preponderance
of the evidence 5 as to the underlying scientific principles
and methodologies. The decision of the trial court to either
admit or exclude evidence will not ordinarily be reversed
on appeal unless the evidence preponderates otherwise ,6
4 See, e.g., Brown v. Crown Equip. Corp., 181 S.W.3d 268, 273 (Tenn.
2005); State v. Scott, 33 S.W.3d 74, 76 (Tenn. 2000); Pimm v. Wickes
Lumber Co.. 845 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). Cf. Pullum
v. Robinette, 174 S.W.3d 124, 139 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004); State v.
Kiser, No. E2005-02406-CCA-R3-DD, 2007 WL 4207903, at *374
(Tenn. Crim. App. 2007), affd, 284 S.W.3d 227 (Tenn. 2009).
5 State v. Edison, 9 S.W.3d 75, 77 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Stamper, 863
S.W.2d 404, 405 (Tenn. 1993).
6 See TENN. R. APP. P. 13. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. TND Assocs.,
L.P., No. E2007-01073-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 1899984, at *2 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2008). ("In a non-jury case [...], we review the record de
novo with a presumption of correctness as to the trial court's
determination of facts, and we must honor those findings unless the
evidence preponderates to the contrary. The trial court's conclusions of
law are reviewed de novo and are accorded no presumption of
correctness. A trial court's decisions regarding the admission of
evidence will not be overturned absent a showing of abuse of
discretion.") (internal citations omitted). Under the abuse of discretion
standard, a trial court ruling will not be disturbed if reasonable minds
can disagree as to its propriety, and no abuse of discretion will be found
unless the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard or reached a
decision against logic or reasoning that causes an injustice to the party
complaining. Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001).
An abuse of discretion occurs when the lower court's decision is
without a basis in law or fact and is therefore "arbitrary, illogical, or
unconscionable." State v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 18
S.W.3d 186, 191 (Tenn. 2000); see also Edison, 9 S.W.3d at 77; State
v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1993).
3
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where the trial court's discretion is arbitrarily exercised 7 or
is otherwise abused.8 In addition to the science involved,
as part of this initial process the trial court will review the
qualifications of any proposed expert witness.
9
II. Relevance to the Inquiry
With this standard in mind, the next issue that a trial
court will consider is whether the proposed evidence is
relevant to the inquiry.' 0 If the evidence is not relevant, the
inquiry stops there." However, if the proposed evidence is
deemed relevant, it is admissible, subject to other
established rules of evidence and privilege. 12  The
7 State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 562 (Tenn. 1993); Baggett v.
State, 421 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Tenn. 1967).
8 Coe v. State, 17 S.W.3d 193, 218 (Tenn. 2000).
9 Brown v. Crown Equip., 181 S.W.3d at 274-75.
'0 TENN. R. EvID. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.").
1 See State v. Mosley, 200 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005)
(proffered testimony did not have any bearing on any fact that pertained
to the defendant's guilt or innocence); State v. Davis, No. E2006-
01450-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 3245414, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov.
5, 2007) (hypothetical question to an expert called for speculation).
12 TENN. R. EvID. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible except as
provided by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of
Tennessee, these rules, or other rules or laws of general application in
the courts of Tennessee. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible."). See. e.g., State v. Matthews, No. M2007-01755-CCA-
R3-CD, 2009 WL 2391296, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 5, 2009);
State v. Waggoner, No. M2006-00553-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL
1341770, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 8, 2007); Wicks v. Vanderbilt
Univ., No. M2006-00613-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 858780, at *10
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2007); State v. Curtis, No. W2006-02347-
CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 4530821, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 26,
2007). See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-201(b), which codifies the
so-called spousal communication privilege.
4
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requirements of this rule must be satisfied in order to admit
the testimony of an expert witness or any scientific
evidence.13 For example, in State v. Odoy, the Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals found relevant the testimony of
Dr. William Bass, a forensic anthropologist at the
University of Tennessee, who described wounds on the
victim's skeleton as being consistent with the alleged
murder weapon. 14
In addition, the issue of relevance is often raised
when the prosecution attempts to introduce autopsy
photographs into evidence. In order for any photograph to
be admissible, it must first accurately depict the scene. 15 In
Tennessee, the standard relevance rule for photographs is
stated in State v. Banks: "The admissibility of photographs
is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial
court and will not be overturned on appeal without a clear
showing of abuse of that discretion." 16  Further, the
Tennessee Supreme Court held that the admissibility of
photographs of murder victims is within the discretion of
the trial court after considering the relevance, probative
value, and potential unfair prejudicial effect of such
13 State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 307 (Tenn. 2007) (admitting
expert testimony for the defendant to determine the reliability of
eyewitness identification); State v. Ayers, 200 S.W.3d 618, 622-23
(Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) (admitting expert testimony on gunshot
residue patterns [GSR]); State v. Price, 46 S.W.3d 785, 809-10 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 2000) (admitting DNA evidence). Cf State v. Campbell,
904 S.W.2d 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (denying admission of expert
testimony from a psychologist regarding sexual abuse); State v. Poole,
No. W2007-00447-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1025868, at *11 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Apr. 14, 2009) (concluding that expert psychiatric
testimony was irrelevant and inadmissible).
14 State v. Oody, 823 S.W.2d 554, 565-66 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).
15 Phillips v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 867 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1992); State v. Howard, No. W2008-00208-CCA-R3-CD, 2009
WL 1034506, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2009).
16 564 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Tenn. 1978). Banks is the leading case in
Tennessee regarding the admissibility of photographs.
5
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evidence. 17  Generally, "photographs of the corpse are
admissible in murder prosecutions if they are relevant to
the issues on trial, notwithstanding their gruesome and
horrifying character."' 18  The probative value of the
evidence must be weighed against any unfair prejudice the
defendant may suffer if the evidence is admitted, and the
evidence may be excluded only if the unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs the probative value. 9 This rule has
been applied in numerous circumstances, including
determining admissibility of photographs of homicide
victims and crimes scenes.
20
III. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence
There are occasions when evidence that is otherwise
relevant is nonetheless subject to exclusion. 2 1 For example,
17 State v. Blair, No. E2008-00073-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 Tenn. Crim.
App. LEXIS 1032, at *22 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 17, 2009)
(paraphrasing Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 950-5 1).
I8 Id. (quoting Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 950-51).
19 Id. (citing Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 951). See also State v. Vann, 976
S.W.2d 93, 102-03 (Tenn. t998) (holding that the probative value in
admitting a photograph depicting prior sexual abuse was not
substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice); State v.
Goodner, No. E2007-01048-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 605141, at *23
(Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2009) (concluding that admission of the
victim's photograph did not prejudice the defendant).
20 State v. Carter, 114 S.W.3d 895, 903 (Tenn.2003) (concluding that
photographs were relevant to establish the heinous, atrocious, or cruel
aggravating circumstance of the murder); State v. Griffis, 964 S.W.2d
577, 594-95 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (concluding that photographs
showing the victim's injuries were "relevant and highly probative");
State v. Hullom, No. M2006-01041-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1174904,
at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 19, 2007) (concluding that photographs
depicting injury to victim and bloody clothing were relevant); State v.
Leverston, No. W2006-02304-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 4245725, at
*14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 3, 2007).
21 TENN. R. EvID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
6
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admitting color photographs of a bruised, bloodied, nude,
infant victim where the medical cause of death was not in
dispute would be considered improper.22 The Tennessee
Supreme Court has opined on the issue, saying:
Not all logically relevant evidence is admissible.
Thus evidence, which would advance the inquiry
but would also inflame or unduly distract the jury
or require an undeserved expenditure of judicial
time or unfairly surprise the opponent may not be
admissible. The probative weight of evidence
must be balanced against those attendant costs in
determining that evidence should be admitted.23
However, under TENNESSEE RULE OF EVIDENCE 704,
testimony is not objectionable as evidence simply because
it "embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact.",24  Notwithstanding this provision, expert opinion
testimony is "not admissible on an ultimate issue if the jury
could readily draw its own conclusions on the matter
without the aid of the witness' opinion."
25
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.").
22 State v. Collins, 986 S.W.2d 13, 20-21 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998); see
State v. Young, 196 S.W.3d 85, 105-06 (Tenn. 2006) (holding that
photograph of victim was prejudicial and inadmissible).
Otis v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 850 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Tenn.
1992) (internal citation omitted).
24 TENN. R. EvID. 704. See State v. Shuck, 953 S.W.2d 662, 668
(Tenn. 1997).
25 State v. Turner, 30 S.W.3d 355, 360 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000)
(internal citations omitted).
7
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IV. Testimony by Experts26
Formerly, historical discomfort with expert
testimony centered on unscrupulous persons who were
charlatans 27 masquerading as experts. Of course, until the
twentieth century, it was often difficult to verify the
qualifications of these individuals. With a new focus on
detailed record keeping and the ability to research the
backgrounds of individuals, this evil has been substantially
confined. However, the accuracy of the so-called science
was usually left to the judgment and credibility of the
individual expert witness, as evaluated by the jury.2 ' The
difficulty with this proposition was that neither the jury nor
26 TENN. R. EVID. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.").
27 "A person who makes elaborate, fraudulent, and often voluble
claims to skill or knowledge. . . ." Dictionary.com, Charlatan,
http://dictionary.reference.comlbrowse/charlatan (last visited Apr. 24,
2010). Synonyms: imposter, mountebank, fraud, phony, quack. Id.
The term "charlatan" is apparently derived from the Italian word
ciarlatano and originally referred to a native of the Umbrian village of
Cerreto, which was known for its quacks. Id. The term later was used
to describe those persons who set up booths in town squares to hawk
remedies. See David Gentilcore, Charlatans, Mountebanks and Other
Similar People: The Regulation and Role of Itinerant Practitioners in
Early Modern Italy, 20 Soc. Hist. 297, 299 (1995) (noting that in city
squares charlatans would "appear from all comers, performing tricks
and skits, and selling trinkets and dubious remedies, all competing for
the attention of the public").
28 State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 521 (Tenn. 2009) ("The
credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and
the reconciliation of conflicts in the proof are matters entrusted to the
jury as the trier of fact.").
8
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the judge in ruling on admissibility had any objective basis
to determine the witness's scientific credibility.
2 9
The first real attempt to create some method for the
court to gauge the validity of the science itself came in the
watershed decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in Frye v. United States.30 The
test for admissibility in Frye was a simple creation,
implemented with no explanation by the court, and strictly
involved determining if a consensus of the experts in a
given field agreed that the science was valid.31 Thus,
instead of relying upon the word of one expert, now the
courts were asked to rely upon the words of a group of
experts without any independent evaluation by the trier of
fact.
The rapid advances and all-encompassing
expansion of the scope and spectrum of the sciences in the
last fifty years left the Frye standard behind. What the
courts needed was a methodology of their own, in the
language of the courts, that could be used to determine the
validity of any scientific principle and its application to the
particular issues in litigation. In 1993, the United States
Supreme Court penned an elegant and insightful opinion in
the case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals that
allowed a court for the first time to conduct its own
independent review of the validity of a scientific principle
before permitting a jury to hear any evidence based on the
principle.
32
It is no mistake that the process outlined in Daubert
closely mirrors the scientific method process that scientists
themselves use to verify the validity of the results of their
29 See Frye v. United States, 293 F.103, 1014 (D.C. Cir 1923)
(landmark case establishing an objective test for determining the
admissibility of expert testimony).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (1993).
9
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inquiries and their discoveries. 33 With this graceful leap,
the courts were now able to view the actual making of the
sausage. It was in this context that the Court in Daubert
stated its goals:
The inquiry envisioned by [Federal Rule of
Evidence] Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible
one. Its overarching subject is the scientific
validity-and thus the evidentiary relevance and
reliability-of the principles that underlie a
proposed submission. The focus, of course, must
be solely on principles and methodology, not on
the conclusions that they generate.
34
As in any endeavor involving human interaction, the
Daubert methodology is not foolproof; there are no
absolute guarantees in the process. However, with the
Daubert decision, the courts have moved much closer to
today's scientific reality. With this background in mind,
the next step is to examine the current framework for the
treatment of expert testimony.
A. The Opinion Rule
Almost one hundred and twenty years ago in
Powers v. McKenzie, the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in
commenting on the qualifications of an expert witness as
opposed to that of a lay witness, stated:
The true distinction between an expert and a non-
expert witness, says Mr. Wharton, "is that the
latter gives the results of a process of reasoning
familiar to every-day life, and the former gives the
I d. at 593.
34 Id. at 594-95 (footnote omitted).
10
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results of a process of reasoning which can be
mastered only by special scientists." It is obvious
that, however an "expert" may be defined, he
should, in order to give his opinion as an expert,
have some special as well as practical
acquaintance with the immediate line of inquiry.
Where the line between an expert and a non-expert
should be drawn must, under the varying
conditions of cases and their environments,
necessarily be laid down by the judexfori; and this
court will not reverse on account of the judgment
of the lower court as to whether a witness offered
[to that court] is an expert, unless we can clearly
see that he was in error in respect to the
qualification of the witness, and that his error was
injurious.
35
The modern Opinion Rule is based upon the
common law "Opinion Rule," sometimes called the "Pure
Opinion Rule." The Tennessee Supreme Court stated this
rule succinctly only a few years after Powers:
While the general rule is that witnesses must speak
to facts, yet, upon questions of skill or science,
men who have made the subject matter of
investigation the object of their particular study
are competent to give their opinions in evidence.
But they will not be permitted to state their
opinion upon any point the jury has to decide.
Deductions from facts belong to the jury, and
15 16 S.W. 559, 562 (Tenn. 1891). See Otis, 850 S.W.2d at 443 ("To
give expert testimony, one must be particularly skilled, learned or
experienced in a science, art, trade, business, profession or vocation.
The expert must possess a thorough knowledge upon which he testifies
that is not within the general knowledge and experience of the average
person.").
11
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when the examination extends so far as to
substitute the opinion of the witness, upon the
very issue in controversy, for that of the jury, the
province of that tribunal is unwarrantably invaded.
Necessity alone is the ground upon which expert
testimony rests, and the moment this necessity
ceases, the exception to the general rule, which
requires facts and not opinions from witnesses,
ceases also. "Hence," say the supreme court [sic]
of Pennsylvania, in Graham v. Penn Co., 139 Pa.
149, 21 A. 151 (Pa. 1891), "whenever the
circumstances can be fully and adequately
described to the jury, and are such that their
bearing on the issue can be estimated by all men,
without special knowledge or training, opinions of
witnesses, experts or otherwise, are not
admissible."
36
Note, however, that the common law requirement of
necessity has since been relaxed in Tennessee by the
current provisions of Rule 702 of the Tennessee Rules of
Evidence. 37  The requirement now is that such opinion
testimony must substantially assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. 38
Typically, a qualified expert may render an opinion,
which is based upon his or her own training, education, and
experience. 39 Under TENNESSEE RULE OF EVIDENCE 703,
36 Bruce v. Beall, 41 S.W. 445, 448 (Tenn. 1897) (quoting Graham v.
Pennsylvania Co., 139 Ps. 149, 153 (Pa. 1891)) (emphasis added)
(internal citation omitted). See, e.g., Moon v. State, 242 S.W. 39
(Tenn. 1921); Fortune v. State, 277 S.W.2d 381 (Tenn. 1955).
37 See State v. Shuck, 953 S.W.2d 662, 668 (Tenn. 1997).
38 Id. See also State v. Campbell, 904 S.W.2d 608, 616 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1995) (ruling that testimony of a psychologist would not
"substantially assist" the trier of fact).
39 Hoy v. DRM, Inc., 114 P.3d 1268, 1282 (Wyo. 2005) ("If the
[expert] witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then the
12
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this opinion may be based on what would otherwise be
inadmissible hearsay40 if "the type of hearsay is one that
would be reasonably relied upon by experts in the
situation. '4 1 It is, of course, this "basis of opinion" that is
witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion
reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and
how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.").
40 TENN. R. EvID. 801(c) ("'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."). Hearsay is
typically not admissible unless it falls under one of the established
exceptions to the hearsay rule, delineated in TENN. R. EVID. 803, 804,
and 805. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 920 S.W.2d 247, 255-56 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1995) (admitting statements of a rape victim used in aid of
medical treatment); State v. Rucker, 847 S.W.2d 512, 516 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1992) (admitting statements to a physician by a child abuse victim
for treatment purposes). But see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
68 (2004) (creating an exception to the admission of permissible
hearsay where it would violate a criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation and recognizing the concept of
testimonial versus non-testimonial hearsay); State v. Cannon, 254
S.W.3d 287, 309 (Tenn. 2008) (holding that admission of the victim's
testimonial, out-of-court statements to an officer violated the
defendant's right of confrontation).
41 TENN. R. EvID. 703:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by or made known to the expert at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence. Facts or
data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be
disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion
or inference unless the court determines that their
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the
expert's opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect. The court shall disallow testimony
in the form of an opinion or inference if the
13
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the crux of credibility and weight of the evidence
determinations by the jury. Additionally, in forming his or
her opinion, the expert may rely upon input, opinion, or
findings from other experts, as well as facts, which are
brought to that expert's attention by investigators or are
based on the expert's first-hand knowledge.
42
If the expert's opinion is based upon facts adduced
through the employment of a scientific theory, process,
procedure, technique or methodology, then that theory or
methodology must comply with the relevant rules of
evidence that control the admissibility of scientific
evidence.43 If, however, an expert's opinion is based on a
scientific principle or methodology already judicially or
statutorily recognized for producing reliable results, then
there is no need for a trial court to determine the
underlying facts or data indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
See State v. Kennedy, 7 S.W.3d 58, 66 (Tenn. Crim. App.1999):
Clearly, Rule 703 contemplates that inherently
reliable information is admissible to show the basis
for an expert's opinion, even if the information would
otherwise constitute inadmissible hearsay. Indeed, it
is not uncommon for an expert witness's opinion to
be based on facts or data that are not admissible into
evidence, but are reliable. In determining the
reliability of the underlying information, that
underlying data must be such that experts in that field
reasonably rely on them in forming the same kinds of
opinions or inferences that the expert in this case did.
Thus, Tenn. R. Evid. 703 provides that an expert may
base an opinion upon clearly inadmissible hearsay, if
the type of hearsay is one that would be reasonably
relied upon by experts in that situation.
42 See NEIL COHEN, SARAH Y. SHEPPARD, & DONALD F. PAINE,
TENNESSEE LAW OF EVIDENCE 7-63 (Lexis Publishing 4th ed. 2000).
41 Id. at 7-32.
14
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admissibility of that evidence. 44 The court may simply take
judicial notice of the reliability of that science.
45
44 TENN. R. EVID. 201 states:
Judicial notice of adjudicative facts
(a) Scope of Rule. This rule governs only
judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(b) Kinds of Facts. A judicially noticed
fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute, in that it is either (1)
generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)
capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.
(c) When Discretionary. A court may take
judicial notice whether requested or not.
(d) When Mandatory. A court shall take
judicial notice if requested by a party
and supplied with the necessary
information.
See Fortune v. State, 277 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Tenn. 1955):
Generally speaking, judicial notice may be taken of
any fact which is of common notoriety. The contrary
of this is not so, however. A judge or juror cannot, in
the name of judicial notice, substitute his own
personal knowledge for evidence. There is a real
distinction between a judge's personal knowledge as
a private person, or knowledge acquired by him as a
judge upon another trial, and his knowledge as a
judge. As a judge, he should ignore what he knows
as an individual or knowledge which has come to him
upon another trial in which evidence was given to
bring about that knowledge. Of course, no fixed rule
can be laid down declaring what will be judicially
noticed. In a general way courts will notice without
evidence all facts that are part of the general
knowledge of the country.
15
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Nonetheless, the expert's opinion is subject to
several challenges to its credibility: the underlying
scientific theory, methodology, or laboratory analysis was
not conducted properly; the individual laboratory analyst
was not qualified to perform the testing or did not follow
laboratory protocols; the laboratory was not certified or its
quality control was deficient; the evidence being tested was
not properly handled or stored-perhaps spoliation or
alteration occurred; or the chain of custody of the evidence
was compromised.46 These direct challenges to an expert's
opinion and thus to the expert's credibility should be
conducted by cross-examination and by the production of
countervailing evidence. 47  For the first time, jurors now
45 See Commonwealth v. Martin, 290 S.W.3d 59, 66 (Ky. Ct. App.
2008); see, e.g., United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993)
(the court approved the taking of judicial notice of the general
acceptance of DNA and also offered an excellent early discussion of
the analytical steps in the determination of the admissibility of
scientific evidence in general); Gordon's Transp. Inc. v. Bailey, 294
S.W.2d 313, 333 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956) ("[C]ourts will ordinarily take
judicial notice of the operation and effect of natural laws and of
nature's powers and forces, with the limitation that such notice is
limited to those natural laws which are of universal occurrence,
invariable in their action and of common knowledge.") (internal
citation omitted).
46 TENN. R. EvID. 901(a) ("The requirement of authentication or
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by
evidence sufficient to the court to support a finding by the trier of fact
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."). See, e.g.,
State v. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d 287 (Tenn. 2008); State v. Rome, No.
W2006-00838-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2331018 (Tenn. Crim. App.
June 5, 2008). Cf Scott, 33 S.W.3d at 760 ("The purpose of the chain
of custody requirement is to demonstrate that there has been no
tampering, loss, substitution, or mistake with respect to the evidence.
The identity of tangible evidence, however, need not be proven beyond
all possibility of doubt, and the state is not required to establish facts
which exclude every possibility of hampering.") (internal citations
omitted).
47 See, e.g., Fortune v. State, 277 S.W.2d 381, 384 (Tenn. 1955)
("Thus when such [expert] witnesses are offered it will be a question of
16
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have an objective standard to employ as they examine and
gauge both the expert's credibility and the underlying
scientific evidence.
B. The Impact of Frye 48 and Daubert49
In light of the codification of Tennessee Rule of
Evidence 702, the Supreme Court of Tennessee in 1997
determined that the admissibility test for scientific evidence
announced in Frye was no longer applicable. 50 Instead, the
Court in McDaniel, without having expressly adopted
Daubert's non-exclusive criteria, established a new test
loosely based upon those considerations. 51  The Court
enumerated the new test as follows:
A Tennessee trial court may consider in
determining reliability: (1) whether scientific
evidence has been tested and the methodology
with which it has been tested; 52 (2) whether the
evidence has been subjected to peer review or
publication; (3) whether a potential rate of error is
known; (4) whether, as formerly required by Frye,
the evidence is generally accepted in the scientific
community; and (5) whether the expert's research
in the field has been conducted independent of
litigation.53
their credibility which of course is attacked by searching cross
examination as to training, etc.").
4' 293 F.1013 (D.C. Cir 1923).
49 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
50 See McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 262-64 (Tenn.
1997).
51 Id. at 265.
52 See infra Part IV-C for a discussion of the Scientific Method.
53 McDaniel, 955 S.W.2d at 265.
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The Court then offered further guidance for trial courts:
Although the trial court must analyze the science
and not merely the qualifications, demeanor or
conclusions of experts, the court need not weigh
or choose between two legitimate but conflicting
scientific views. The court instead must assure
itself that the opinions are based on relevant
scientific methods, processes, and data, and not
54upon an expert's mere speculation....
We recognize that the burden placed on
trial courts to analyze and to screen novel
scientific evidence is a significant one. No
framework exists that provides for simple and
practical application in every case; the complexity
and diversity of potential scientific evidence is
simply too vast for the application of a single
testy.
Finally, the Court observed:
The trial court is not required to determine
whether it agrees with the evidence and should not
substitute its view for the trier of fact. It should
allow the jury to consider legitimate but
conflicting views about the scientific proof.
Provided the evidence is scientifically valid,
criticisms of it and opposing views may be elicited





56 Id. at 266.
18
6:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 179
However, there is no requirement that all these factors be
considered in each case before allowing expert testimony.57
C. The Five McDaniel Factors
1. The Scientific Method
If it can be demonstrated that there has been strong
adherence to the principles of the Scientific Method in the
development of any scientific principle or methodology,
then that principle or methodology can be considered
reliable and any conclusions generated by it can be
considered trustworthy.58 This is the underlying focus of
the decision in Daubert, in which the Court noted the
59scientific method as the hallmark of science.
The scientific method, a concept dating back at least
to Sir Issac Newton's practices, is a process that is the basis
for scientific inquiry. The scientific method follows a
57 See Brown v. Crown Equip., 181 S.W. 3d at 277 ("The rigid
application of the McDaniel factors to all expert testimony is
problematic because all expert testimony may not 'fit' within the
factors."). See, e.g., Chandler v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store,
Inc., No. E2006-00956-WC-R3-WC, 2007 WL 1710572, ** 4-6 (Tenn.
Workers' Comp. Panel May 8, 2007).
58 Gentry v. Mangum, 466 S.E.2d 171, 174 (W.Va. 1995).
59 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593:
Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in
determining whether a theory or technique is
scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact
will be whether it can be (and has been) tested.
"Scientific methodology today is based on generating
hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be
falsified; indeed, this methodology is what
distinguishes science from other fields of human
inquiry."
(quoting E. GREEN & C. NEESON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS
ON EVIDENCE 645 (1983)).
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series of steps: (1) identify a problem that needs to be
solved, (2) formulate a hypothesis, (3) test the hypothesis,
(4) collect and analyze the data, and (5) make
conclusions. It is, therefore, no accident that great
deference is given to the application of the scientific
method in various disciplines within the field of forensic
science. For example, in fire and arson investigations, the
well-recognized National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA), in its authoritative Guide for Fire and Explosion
Investigations series, commences its in-depth discussion of
the topic with a chapter offering detailed instruction to
investigators on the applicability and use of the scientific
method. 61 Compliance with the procedures in the NFPA
guide has formed the basis for admissibility of scientific
fire and arson evidence in numerous cases around the
United States.62  In addition, there are various published
standards, which establish protocols and methodologies
that are generally accepted within the worldwide scientific
and industrial community.63 It has also been suggested that
where there is no scientific consensus among respected,
well-credentialed scientists as to what is and what is not
"good science," the court's responsibility might be to
60 Labwrite Glossary, http://www.ncsu.edu/labwrite/res/res-glossary.
html (last visited Mar. 2, 2010).
61 NFPA 921: GuIDE FOR FIRE & EXPLOSION INVESTIGATIONS ch. 4
(2008).
62 See, e.g., ANDRE A. MOENSSENS, ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 1274-78 (5th ed. 2007) (discussing the
scientific method as it relates to the field of behavioral sciences).
63 See ASTM International, http://www.astm.org (last visited Mar. 2,
2010). With the active participation of members of the scientific, legal,
and educational communities, including members of the American
Academy of Forensic Sciences, ASTM has established and published
standards, which are applicable to the forensic sciences as well. Id.
See also Turner v. State, 746 So. 2d 355 (Ala. 1998).
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occasionally reject such expert testimony because it was
not "derived by the scientific method.,
64
2. Peer Review or Publication
Commenting upon the concept of peer review, the
Court in Daubert observed:
Another pertinent consideration is whether the
theory or technique has been subjected to peer
review and publication. Publication (which is but
one element of peer review) is not a sine qua non
of admissibility; it does not necessarily correlate
with reliability, and in some instances well-
grounded but innovative theories will not have
been published. Some propositions, moreover, are
too particular, too new, or of too limited interest to
be published. But submission to the scrutiny of
the scientific community is a component of "good
science," in part because it increases the likelihood
that substantive flaws in methodology will be
detected. The fact of publication (or lack thereof)
in a peer reviewed journal thus will be a relevant,
though not dispositive, consideration in assessing
the scientific validity of a particular technique or
methodology on which an opinion is premised.65
It has been said that "[t]he role of peer review is 'to
promote the publication of well-conceived articles so that
the most important review, the consideration of the
reported results by the scientific community, may occur
64 Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1316.
65 Id. at 593-94 (internal citations omitted). See, e.g., 1 PAUL C.
GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1.08,
43-44 (4th ed. 2007).
21
6:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 182
after publication."' 66  Further, that peer review "means
publication in a refereed journal, such as SCIENCE,
NATURE, or the JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL
,,67
ASSOCIATION. Note, however, that the lack of peer
review does not necessarily render an expert's opinion
unreliable.
68
3. Potential Rate of Error
The potential false positive rate of error of a
scientific technique or test is significant in the forensic
science context, while a false negative rate of error is
important in the overall state of the science involved.69 The
existence of a known rate of error "is not a prerequisite
under Tennessee law for the admission of expert testimony
but is one of many considerations that the court may
consider in its gate keeping functions." 70  However, the
Court advised in Daubert that "[L]n the case of a particular
scientific technique, the court ordinarily should consider
the known or potential rate of error, and the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's
operation.",71 On remand of Daubert, the Ninth Circuit
observed:
Peer review and publication do not, of course,
guarantee that an expert's conclusions reached are
correct; much published scientific research is
greeted with intense skepticism and is not borne
out by further research. But the test under
Daubert is not the correctness of the expert's
66 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 60, § 1.08, at 44-45.
67 Id. at 45-46.
68 Brown v. Crown Equip., 181 S.W. 3d at 278.
69 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 65, § 1.08, at 46-47.
70 Chandler, 2007 WL 1710572 at *6.
71 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
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conclusions but the soundness of his methodology.
That the research is accepted for publication in a
reputable scientific journal after being subjected to
the usual rigors of peer review is a significant
indication that it is taken seriously by other
scientists, i.e., that it meets at least the minimal
criteria of good science. If nothing else, peer
review and publication "increase the likelihood
that substantive flaws in methodology will be
detected."
72
It should be noted that where the legislature has established
the admissibility of a particular scientific test, the failure of
the legislature to consider any known rate of error
apparently does not impinge on the admissibility of any test
results.73
4. General Acceptance in the Scientific
Community
This standard is, of course, the Frye standard.74 By
specifically adopting this standard, the Tennessee Supreme
72 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th
Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted).
73 Cribbs v. State, No. W2006-01381-CCA-R3-PD, 2009 WL
1905454, at *40 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2009).
74 See Frye, 293 F. at 1014:
"The rule is that the opinions of experts or skilled
witnesses are admissible in evidence in those cases in
which the matter of inquiry is such that inexperienced
persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a
correct judgment upon it, for the reason that the
subject-matter so far partakes of a science, art, or
trade as to require a previous habit or experience or
study in it, in order to acquire a knowledge of it.
When the question involved does not lie within the
range of common experience or common knowledge,
23
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Court implicitly adopted all pre-existing case law in
Tennessee that interpreted and applied the Frye rule. As
observed by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert:
"[G]eneral acceptance" can yet have a bearing on
the inquiry. A "reliability assessment does not
require, although it does permit, explicit
identification of a relevant scientific community
and an express determination of a particular
degree of acceptance within that community."
Widespread acceptance can be an important factor
in ruling particular evidence admissible, and "a
known technique which has been able to attract
only minimal support within the community," may
properly be viewed with skepticism.
75
Many reported opinions discuss the testimonies of forensic
anthropologists. The subject matter of these testimonies
but requires special experience or special knowledge,
then the opinions of witnesses skilled in that
particular science, art, or trade to which the question
relates are admissible in evidence."
Numerous cases are cited in support of this rule. Just
when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the
line between the experimental and demonstrable
stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id. (quoting Appellant's Brief) (emphasis added).
15 509 U.S. at 594 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224,
1238) (3d Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted).
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ranges over multiple factual areas, such as specific
identification of the decedent, including age, gender,
stature, and race;76 identification of a defendant from a
photograph or surveillance video, 77 using ear 78 and facial
recognition points;79 the comparison of weapons with
wound patterns,s° describing a skull fracture 8l or that a
head wound was consistent with a gunshot;8 2 method of
disposal of a body;8 3 time of death;
84 and cause of death.85
Unfortunately, the vast majority of these opinions do not
discuss the admissibility of such testimony vel non,86 but
76 See, e.g., State v. Klindt, 389 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Iowa 1986).
77 State v. Douglas, 203 Conn. 445, 450 (Conn. 1987); Penalver v.
State, 926 So.2d 1118, 1134 (Fla. 2006).
78 United States v. McClintock, No. 05-441, 2006 WL
39241, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2006).
79 United States v. Fadayini, 28 F.3d 1236, 1240-41 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
80 Colina v. State, 634 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (Fla. 1994); People v. St.
Pierre, 522 N.E.2d 61, 64 (Ill. 1988).
8' St. Pierre, 522 N.E.2d at 61.
82 State v. Fasola, 901 So.2d 533, 537 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
83 Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 36 (Ky. 1998).
84 State v. Phillips, 659 So.2d 785, 788 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
85 See Wuornos v. State, 644 So. 2d 1012, 1019 (Fla. 1994).
86 For some recent Tennessee cases where the testimony of forensic
anthropologists was received apparently under the "Opinion Rule," see
Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282, 289-90 (Tenn. 2009) (Dr. William
Bass's testimony regarding time of death); State v. Rogers, 188 S.W.3d
593, 600 (Tenn. 2006) (Dr. Murray Marks found no evidence of trauma
as would be expected had a car run over the victim); State v. Davidson,
121 S.W.3d 600, 606 (Tenn. 2003) (Dr. Murray Marks testified that
trauma to the body was inconsistent with animal activity and also
testified regarding the time of death); State v. Bondurant, 4 S.W.3d
662, 665 (Tenn. 1999) (Dr. William Bass "testified that he was 100
percent certain that the bones were human, 75 percent certain that they
came from a male, over 50 percent certain that blunt trauma had been
applied to the skull before it had been burned, and 90 percent certain
that the bones had been in the ground no less than one nor more than
fifteen to twenty years."); State v. Cross, No. 03C01-9810-CR-00358,
1999 WL 1076958, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 1999) (Dr.
William Bass identified the victim, trauma to victim's skull, and
25
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some cases do address this issue. 87 Needless to say, the
reports of forensic anthropologists have been used by
medical examiners and coroners to formulate their opinions
on the time of death and the cause and manner of death.88
5. Research Independent of Litigation
"The objective of the trial court's gate keeping
function is to ensure that 'an expert, whether basing
testimony upon professional studies or personal experience,
employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual
rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the
relevant field."' 89 On remand from the United States
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit in Domingo stated, "this
court [has] explained that, if an expert did not conduct his
or her own research, independent of the litigation, on the
subject of the testimony, the district court must determine
identity of the murder weapon as a shotgun); State v. Oody, 823
S.W.2d 554, 558 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (Dr. William Bass testified
that wounds on a skeleton were consistent with a particular ax); State
v. Phillips, 728 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tenn. Crim. App.1986) (Dr. William
Bass testified regarding the victim's time of death and two gunshot
wounds to the victim's head, whom he identified using known x-rays);
State v. Driver, 634 S.W.2d 601, 604-05 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) (Dr.
William Bass testified that scattered bones were that of the 17-year-old
victim, whom he identified using dental charts).
87 See. e.g., State v. Miller, 429 N.W.2d 26, 39-40 (S.D.1988). The
court addressed the admissibility of a forensic anthropologist's
testimony as to the type of instrument used to inflict certain head
wounds on the decedent, ruling that based upon the expert's experience
and education, such testimony was admissible under Frye. Id.
88 See, e.g., Linn v. Fossum, 946 So.2d 1032 (Fla. 2006).89 Brown v. Crown Equip., 181 S.W.3d at 275 (quoting Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael 526 US 137, 152 (1999)).
26
6:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 187
whether there exists any "objective, verifiable evidence that
the testimony is based on 'scientifically valid principles."'
9 0
The Ninth Circuit explained in Daubert:
One very significant fact to be considered is
whether the experts are proposing to testify about
matters growing naturally and directly out of
research they have conducted independent of the
litigation, or whether they have developed their
opinions expressly for purposes of testifying. That
an expert testifies for money does not necessarily
cast doubt on the reliability of his testimony, as
few experts appear in court merely as an
eleemosynary gesture. But in determining
whether proposed expert testimony amounts to
good science, we may not ignore the fact that a
scientist's normal workplace is the lab or the field,
not the courtroom or the lawyer's office. 9'
The decisions in Daubert and McDaniel have given
Tennessee courts a methodology for determining the
validity and relevance of both scientific principles and the
experts who purport to know and apply them.
V. Conclusion
In summary, here is how an attorney's checklist for
the admissibility of forensic evidence might look:
90 Domingo v. T.K., 289 F.3d 600, 606 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317-18 (9th Cir.
1995)) (emphasis added).
91 Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317.
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* Admissibility is at the discretion of the court. See
TENN. R. EviD. 104.
" Proposed evidence must be relevant to the inquiry.
See TENN. R. EvID. 401,402.
* Relevant evidence may still be subject to exclusion.
See TENN. R. EvID. 403, 801, 803, 804, 805.
" Expert testimony to scientific knowledge that is not
subject to judicial notice is subject to a scientific
credibility analysis. See TENN. R. EviD. 201,901.
v" The Opinion Rule-see TENN. R. EvID. 702,
703,704.
v$ Daubert Criteria-see 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
/ McDaniel Factors-see 955 S.W.2d 257,
262-64 (Tenn. 1997).
1. The Scientific Method
2. Peer Review or Publication
3. Potential Rate of Error
4. General Acceptance in the Scientific
Community
5. Research Independent of Litigation
Every lawyer and judge should be using a
subconscious checklist in preparing and reviewing forensic
evidence, but when preparing for trial, a written evidentiary
checklist, such as the one described here, can help to ensure
that evidence vital to your case is given the credibility it
deserves.
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